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Climate action pledges have increasingly taken the form of commitments to net carbon neutrality. Higher ed-
ucation institutions (HEIs) are uniquely positioned to innovate in this area, and over 800 United States (U.S.)
colleges and universities have pledged to achieve net carbon neutrality. We examine the approaches of
11 U.S. HEIs that have already announced achieving net carbon neutrality, highlighting risks associated
with treating carbon offsets, unbundled renewable energy certificates, and bioenergy (collectively 77% of re-
ductions across institutions) as best practice under current frameworks. While pursuing neutrality has led to
important institutional shifts toward sustainability, the initial mix of approaches used by these HEIs appears
out of alignment with a broader U.S. decarbonization roadmap; in aggregate, these early neutrality efforts un-
derutilize electrification and new zero-carbon electricity. We conclude by envisioning how HEIs (and others)
can refocus climate mitigation efforts toward decarbonization and actions that will help shift policy and mar-
kets at larger scales.
INTRODUCTION
Net carbon-neutrality commitments are one of the most visible
forms of leadership in the face of the climate crisis. As of 2020,
at least 25 national governments and the European Union have
pledged to achieve net carbon neutrality (also referred to as
net zero emissions, although the precise meaning of ‘‘net zero’’
varies by jurisdiction) by 2050.1 Broadly, these individual com-
mitments can help align global emissions with a pathway that
can keep temperature increases well below 2C, consistent
with the Paris Agreement.2
Because current government policies are not sufficient to
avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system,3,4 non-state actors have become an important source
of leadership to advance climate action.5 Voluntary carbon miti-
gation by non-state actors can achieve reductions in carbon
emissions, pilot and demonstrate innovations in decarbonization
approaches, and signal to policy-makers a willingness to partic-
ipate in a low- or zero-carbon economy in ways that can induce
more ambitious action targets from governments.6 Numerous
non-profit and for-profit organizations have begun pursuing in-
ternal carbon pricing across supply chains,7 purchasing renew-
able electricity,8 making carbon-neutrality commitments,9 and,
increasingly, adopting targets for climate mitigation consistent
with holding temperature increases below 2C, including
pledges to become carbon negative.10
As enduring non-profit institutions with educational missions,
United States (U.S.) higher education institutions (HEIs) are
uniquely positioned to play a role as climate action leaders.
Beginning in 2006, U.S. HEI presidents signed onto the American
College and University Presidents’ Climate Commitment
(ACUPCC) to develop targets and plans to achieve carbon
neutrality ‘‘as soon as possible.’’11 These early commitments to
the ambitious goal of carbon neutrality make this sector unique
in the U.S. As net carbon-neutrality commitments proliferate
globally, it is appropriate to ask what approaches to achieving
neutrality actually look like in practice. The approaches adopted
byU.S.HEIs from2006 to 2020 represent an empirical case study
for what achieving neutrality might entail, and for exploring
whether this approach represents a scalable solution to the
climate crisis. Here, we analyze the carbon-neutrality pathways
taken by the 11 leading U.S. HEIs that have already announced
carbon neutrality as of December 2020 and analyze them in the
context of a broader U.S. decarbonization roadmap.
CARBON-NEUTRALITY COMMITMENTS IN U.S. HIGHER
EDUCATION
U.S. HEIs, like all parts of society in developed economies, have
significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that must be rapidly
reduced to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change.
Many HEIs function like small cities with their own heating, po-
wer, and transportation infrastructure. If all full-time students,
faculty, and staff at HEIs in the U.S. were counted together,
U.S. HEIs would be the second most populous U.S. state with
over 29 million people.12
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Since the start of the ACUPCC in 2006, over 800 American
HEIs have signed the carbon-neutrality commitment. In 2015,
the non-profit Second Nature, which has administered the
commitment since 2009, rebranded the ACUPCC as the Car-
bon Commitment and expanded the program to include a
stand-alone climate resilience commitment. Second Nature
maintains a database of the 426 institutions still actively re-
porting annual emissions under the Carbon Commitment,13
362 of which have set carbon-neutrality target dates, which
range from 2012 to 2100 (the median date being 2050
[Figure S1]).
Consistent with practices in the for-profit sectors, carbon
neutrality in the context of U.S. HEI commitments is ‘‘net’’
neutrality, allowing for continued emissions, as long as an equiv-
alent amount of off-site emissions reductions or carbon seques-
tration activities are purchased or undertaken to offset those
continued emissions. Under current guidelines, HEI carbon-
neutrality commitments usually apply to emissions from direct
on-site fossil-fuel use (Scope 1 emissions) and purchased elec-
tricity (Scope 2 emissions). Some also include institutionally-
funded air travel and employee commuting (a subset of Scope
3 emissions), but few encompass other supply-chain
emissions.14
CARBON-NEUTRAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES
While hundreds of institutions are working toward carbon
neutrality, 11 HEIs in the U.S. have already announced
neutrality under the terms of the Carbon Commitment as of
December 2020. We commend these HEIs on their leadership,
their ambitious climate actions, and their achievement of car-
bon neutrality within the standards of the Climate Leadership
Commitments.
We refer to the approach taken by these schools as ‘‘neutrality
first.’’ The institutions have combined on-campus emissions re-
ductions with off-campus accounting-based reductions to meet
neutrality across Scopes 1, 2, and 3 earlier than major campus
infrastructure would generally allow. As many of these institu-
tions have emphasized, a neutrality-first approach is based on
the scientific consensus that we must reduce emissions rapidly
to get on track for less than 1.5C warming.2 Figure 1 shows
the aggregate emissions of the carbon-neutral HEIs in their
year of neutrality and the aggregate emission reductions by cate-
gory (see Notes S1–S11 for more details on each school).
Each institution achieved neutrality through a different
pathway (Figures 2 and 3), yet there are some similarities in
Figure 1. Aggregate reductions in emissions across 11 carbon-neutral U.S. higher education institutions (HEIs) by type of reduction, as well
as aggregate emissions by scope in the baseline years
Dark-green bars show reductions by scope excluding the specific sources of reductions covered by the light-green bars (i.e., Scope 1 emissionswithout including
bioenergy or institution-owned land sequestration, Scope 2 excluding the use of renewable energy certificates [RECs], and Scope 3 emissions from employee
commuting and travel). RECs are divided according to whether they were associated with a power purchase agreement (bundled) or not associated with a power
purchase agreement (unbundled). At schools that switched to bioenergy between their baseline and carbon-neutral year, we attributed all reductions in on-site
stationary combustion emissions to bioenergy.
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approaches. First, roughly half of institutions achieved meaning-
ful reductions in their Scope 1 on-site fossil-fuel emissions be-
tween their baseline year (the year against which they measure
reductions, ranging between 2007 and 2012) and neutrality
year. The median reduction in fossil-fuel-based Scope 1 emis-
sions for these institutions was 28%, but three institutions actu-
ally saw their gross Scope 1 emissions increase from the base-
line year to the carbon-neutrality year. Schools generally
achieved Scope 1 reductions through building and transporta-
tion efficiency measures or by switching heating fuels, for
example, to bioenergy. The four institutions with the largest re-
ductions in reported Scope 1 emissions all deployed bioenergy
strategies (box in Figure 2), which we discuss in more
detail below.
Approaches to reducing Scope 2 emissions varied. Many
schools installed some amount of on-site solar generation to
reduce purchased electricity emissions, while most (nine)
schools purchased renewable energy certificates (RECs) to
‘‘cover’’ Scope 2 emissions (Figure 2). RECs represent the envi-
ronmental attributes of renewable energy generated elsewhere;
‘‘bundled’’ RECs are associated with new power purchase
agreements (PPAs) for renewable electricity, while unbundled
RECs are purchased from voluntary markets without associated
electricity contracts (see below). All institutions reduced Scope 2
emissions simply due to the fact that the carbon intensity of their
electricity grid improved from the baseline year to the year of
neutrality. For example, the reported carbon intensity of the
New York State electricity grid decreased by nearly half from
2007 to 2017.15 Without accounting for REC purchases, the me-
dian reduction in Scope 2 emissions was 31%.With all RECs, the
median reduction was 100%.
Finally, these institutions reduced Scope 3 emissions covered
by the commitment (primarily institution-funded airline travel and
employee commuting) through on-campus incentive programs.
The median reduction was 11%, but reductions varied widely.
Some schools reduced Scope 3 emissions by over 50%,
whereas four schools saw their Scope 3 emissions increase
from their baseline year to their neutrality year (Figure 2). It is
important to note that changes in other Scope 3 emissions,
such as embodied carbon in the supply chain from purchased
goods (e.g., food and building materials), are not required to
be reported under the Carbon Commitment. This is particularly
relevant for natural gas, as schools substituting natural gas for
other fuels are ‘‘shifting’’ some emissions outside of their
neutrality commitments, moving them from Scope 1 (combus-
tion) to Scope 3 (upstream leakage from natural gas infra-
structure).16
No institution achieved net neutrality without significant use of
accounting-based instruments (Figure 3). The majority of all
claimed emissions reductions come from purchased offsets
(payment to a third party for avoided emissions or sequestration)
and unbundled RECs rather than direct emission reductions by
the institution (Figure 2). The median use of offsets and un-
bundled RECs as a share of emission reductions at the time of
neutrality was 63% (46%–107%). The purchased carbon offsets
came primarily from landfill methane and forestry practices
(Figure 4). When bioenergy is included, the median use of these
three accounting-based measures rose to 81% (53%–107%)
(see discussion). In aggregate, these three measures were
77% of total reductions.
Finally, two institutions relied considerably on carbon seques-
tration from college-owned land (Figure 1; Notes S6 and S10). In
this case, the annual carbon sequestered in institution-owned
forests was considered as a reduction in emissions (a ‘‘credit’’
against gross emissions). Current guidance discourages schools
from counting institution-owned land sequestration without a
Figure 2. Reductions by scope for each carbon-neutral HEI before offsets
Reductions (as percentages) from baseline year are shown below zero; increases in emissions are shown above zero. Colored dots represent the same institution
across scopes, and bars are the median. Scope 1 represents on-site combustion, Scope 2 purchased electricity, and Scope 3 institution-funded air travel and
employee commuting. In this figure, we treat bioenergy (HEIs in the dotted box) as carbon neutral, consistent with reporting guidelines. Scope 2 emissions are
shown including all RECs purchased (bundled and unbundled), only counting RECs tied to a power purchase agreement (no unbundled RECs), and before
accounting for RECs (no RECs, i.e., gross changes in Scope 2 based on electricity consumption and grid intensity). One school had a significant increase in local
grid intensity since the baseline year.
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demonstration of additionality (i.e., proof that all of the reduc-
tions represent genuine reductions relative to the status quo).17
These institutions effectively treat the carbon sequestered on
their forest land as additional relative to the regional landscape
of forest management in their areas. In other words, by
conserving the forest, the institution is sequesteringmore carbon
than it would in a world in which the forest landwas not owned by
the institution. One institution has highlighted that this would
make their institution-owned land eligible for offsets under Cali-
fornia’s Forest Management Compliance Offsets Program,
which considers carbon sequestered from activities that are
not ‘‘common practice’’ to be additional. However, a more con-
servative approach to assessing additionality at the project level
would find that a forest stewardship plan that has been largely
unchanged since the baseline year is unlikely to result in addi-
tional carbon sequestration relative to business as usual.
Our discussions with these institutions highlight ongoing chal-
lenges in additionality assessments that are playing out beyond
U.S. HEIs.18 While differences in analyses of additionality
frequently turn on differing approaches to counterfactuals, we
have discussed the land sequestration approaches with these
institutions and remain unconvinced that this sequestration,
although associated with positive land-management practices,
is additional in a way that should be counted toward neutrality
at the institution. At the same time, it is critical for institutions
to model good land-management practices for a climate-con-
strainedworld, and both institutions who chose to count seques-
tration from institution-owned land highlighted the attention to
sustainable practices involved in their decisions (and the risks
associated with institutions ignoring land-management
emissions).
THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A NEUTRALITY-FIRST
APPROACH
Early target dates for net carbon neutrality are designed to
recognize the urgency of reducing emissions and that every
ton of GHG emissions reduced today reduces future climate
damages. These benefits accrue whether they come from on-
site shifts away from fossil fuels, improvements in energy effi-
Figure 3. Share of reductions in HEI GHG
emissions coming from three accounting-
based strategies
Dark bar represents the median.
ciency, or high-quality off-site reductions
(but only under the strong assumption
that all of those reductions are real, perma-
nent, and additional). In theory, ambitious
neutrality commitments should lead
schools to reduce emissions faster than
those without. (We do note that current
practice has not resulted in large reduc-
tions in reported Scope 1 emissions for
these HEIs, other than those that adopted
bioenergy strategies [Figures 1 and 2].
Given the small number of carbon-neutral
HEIs and the quality of the self-reported
data, we cannot quantitatively test here whether, for example,
on-site emissions fell faster at the neutrality-first institutions rela-
tive to others with later commitments.) Second, neutrality com-
mitments have catalyzed infrastructure changes, motivating in-
stitutions to update heating technology, deploy energy-
efficiency measures, and build on-site renewable generation
(see Notes S1–S11 for school profiles). Finally, aggressively pur-
suing carbon neutrality has led to cultural changes at several in-
stitutions, putting in place institutional structures for advancing
sustainability that will continue into the future. Sustainability di-
rectors at these institutions report that achieving carbon
neutrality ‘‘early’’ relative to other institutions mainstreamed
climate-focused thinking throughout institutional decision-mak-
ing processes (K. Payson and J. Pumilio, personal communica-
tions). Several institutions also note that they are actively
continuing to pursue emission reductions even after meeting
neutrality, for example by expanding agreements for renewable
energy,19,20 suggesting that achieving neutrality was a catalyst
for further action at these institutions. At the same time, the ben-
efits of a focus specifically on neutrality in the near term must be
weighed against the notable challenges with the dominant stra-
tegies usually required to meet these goals quickly, as we
describe in more detail below.
ACCOUNTING-BASED EMISSION-REDUCTION
STRATEGIES
Our analysis shows that the majority of emission reductions at
neutrality-first HEIs have come from accounting-based strate-
gies (Figure 3). We underscore that these strategies are widely
used and are standard under the guidelines used to administer
the Second Nature Carbon Commitment. Given that HEIs are
among the first large sectors to adopt carbon-neutrality goals
and thus serve as a highly visible model for pathways to carbon
neutrality, it is worthwhile to assess these institutions’ strategies
in detail. In the next sections, we discuss three salient strategies
used by carbon-neutral HEIs: (1) the use of unbundled RECs to
reduce Scope 2 emissions; (2) the use of bioenergy sources to
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Unbundled renewable energy certificates
Claiming emissions reductions from off-site renewable sources
that enter the electrical grid requires an accounting-based
approach because one cannot track specific electrical energy
from generation source to outlet. RECs were created as ameans
to track quantities of electricity (not emissions) associated with
the generation of renewable energy such as wind and solar.
RECs are accounting instruments that are typically used to track
compliance with state renewable portfolio standards that have
specified targets for the percentage of electricity sales from
renewable energy sources each year. However, RECs are also
sold in voluntary markets and purchased by institutions or other
entities who want to demonstrate their green credentials. (Unlike
utilities, these institutions are not required to hold RECs.) Thus,
RECs are treated as the ‘‘environmental attributes’’ of renewable
generation, and the holder of an REC has the right to claim credit
for the renewable power generated. In most GHG accounting
systems, including the Carbon Commitment under Second Na-
ture, the REC holder can claim the number of kilowatt-hours rep-
resented by the RECs as zero-carbon electricity in their Scope 2
emissions.
RECs can be contracted with their corresponding electricity at
the time when new renewable generation is financed. These
RECs are considered ‘‘bundled RECs’’ because the REC is pur-
chased in a ‘‘bundle’’ with the rights to the electricity in a PPA.
Holders of bundled RECs note that this approach provides cap-
ital to put new renewable energy on the grid and can force utili-
ties to build additional renewable energy to comply with state
renewable mandates (because a bundled project does not allow
the RECs from that new renewable project to be used for utility
compliance), with the result that PPAs are increasingly being
adopted as best practice.8,21 Potential pitfalls include the fact
that new renewables in states with binding cap and trade pro-
grams do not reduce the overall capped emissions,22 and that
the actual impact of any renewable generation depends on the
Figure 4. Types of offsets purchased by the
11 HEIs to declare carbon neutrality
See also Figure S3.
electricity it displaces and the precise de-
tails of the policies and incentives
involved.23
Unbundled RECs, on the other hand, are
sold through secondary markets sepa-
rately from the purchase of the power it-
self, and they can derive from existing
renewable generation that is likely to run
regardless of the sale of the REC.Modeling
of REC purchases suggests that, in some
cases, they are unlikely to increase the
amount of renewable energy on the elec-
tricity grid, and as such these purchases
may lead to little or no actual change in
emissions.23–28
Most RECs used by the U.S. HEIs in our
data are not bundled (Figure 1). Of the nine
schools that purchased RECs to achieve
Scope 2 emission-reduction goals, seven purchased only un-
bundled RECs. From conversations with HEI sustainability prac-
titioners, most in the field regard bundled RECs as ‘‘higher qual-
ity,’’ and at least three institutions have pursued PPAs with
bundled RECs in subsequent years (Notes S3, S5, and S10).
In the absence of more evidence that unbundled RECs are
having an impact on the amount of new renewable energy gen-
eration, these credits may represent a ‘‘dead end’’ as a systems
solution—providing the appearance of action but de minimis
systems or climate impact. Bundled RECs with a PPA offer a
move in the right direction, but even here more research is
needed to understand their impacts on electricity markets and
emissions. Ultimately, most HEIs cannot escape the fact that
they depend on the larger overall grid and policy-induced shifts
in generation, transmission, and storage to achieve meaningful
decarbonization of purchased electricity.
Bioenergy
In the northeastern U.S., home to many of the HEIs leading car-
bon-neutrality efforts, bioenergy has been a popular option for
carbon mitigation, but one that is complicated by the scientific
uncertainty and lack of a broader U.S. policy strategy. Five of
11 institutions deployed biomass or biomass-derived fuels for
on-site use as part of their neutrality strategy. Many current ac-
counting practices (including those in higher education) effec-
tively treat bioenergy as carbon neutral29 by assuming that car-
bon uptake during post-harvest regrowth of forests offsets
carbon emitted to the atmosphere through biomass combus-
tion. The U.S. Congress has directed the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to treat biomass this way via a budget
rider,30 and various European governments view biomass simi-
larly (but with a range of sustainability and carbon-neutrality
criteria).31
However, treating all bioenergy as carbon neutral is not sup-
ported by the best available science. A 2012 report by EPA’s
ll
OPEN ACCESS
1252 One Earth 4, September 17, 2021
Perspective
Science Advisory Board32 concluded: ‘‘Carbon neutrality cannot
be assumed for all biomass energy a priori. There are circum-
stances in which biomass is grown, harvested, and combusted
in a carbon-neutral fashion, but carbon neutrality is not an appro-
priate a priori assumption; it is a conclusion that should be
reached only after considering a particular feedstock’s produc-
tion and consumption cycle.’’
Bioenergy accounting is complicated by the fact that analyses
in the peer-reviewed literature still reach widely divergent conclu-
sions, with some studies claiming that wood pellets offer lower
emissions relative to coal within a few years in the United
Kingdom33 and others suggesting that the use of biomass in-
creases net emissions for decades.34 Recent work suggested
that even relative to coal (most institutions are displacing less car-
bon-intensive natural gas), carbon payback periods for north-
eastern forests were likely to range from 50 to 100 years.35 Signif-
icantly, even if the ‘‘carbon debts’’ are short, front loading of
emissions to be offset by later sequestration (i.e., net carbon
neutrality over time) still may not be climate neutral. System lags
mean that the early pulse of CO2 will increase the heat trapped
in the climate system for years after the pulse has been offset by
sequestration, and this short-termwarmingmay push the climate
system into feedback loops that accelerate warming.36–38
Several institutions took substantial steps to locate bioenergy
with the best possible environmental profile. This meant sourcing
biomass from thinning or waste, from within a particular radius to
reduce transport, and/or from forests that were registered as sus-
tainable working forests so that the land was likely to experience
regrowth. While bioenergy use at these institutions represents
an optimistic scenario whereby ‘‘sustainably’’ harvested biomass
from forested regions is used in high-efficiency cogeneration of
heat and electricity,39 current certifications around forest prac-
tices are not by themselves capable of ensuring a short-term
neutral climate impact. The supply of ‘‘sustainable’’ biomass
which is actually near neutral31mayplaceconstraints on the avail-
ability of these solutions to scale,39 limiting the ability of HEIs that
utilize bioenergy to model approaches for scalable change.
Particularly important from a systems perspective is the global
impact that large-scale bioenergy production could have on land
use and air quality in a climate-constrainedworld. Themost recent
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report on
climate change and land concluded that while bioenergy can
contribute to mitigation, it could also have negative impacts on
foodsecurity, desertification, and landdegradation ifbest practices
are not followed to limit bioenergy production to marginal lands or
abandoned cropland.40 Conversely, economists project that eco-
nomic uses for forest products could slow the rate of land conver-
sion by making it economic to maintain ownership of forests and
intensify management for more biomass,41 a dynamic that will be
very sensitive to markets and local conditions.42
The neutrality-first HEIs that switched to bioenergy reported
substantial reductions in Scope 1 emissions when they counted
it as carbon neutral. If they treated the biogenic CO2 as emis-
sions (with zero offsetting land uptake), most would have
seen an increase in emissions (Figure S2). The truth likely lies
somewhere in between. It is beyond the scope of this perspec-
tive to resolve the debates around bioenergy’s neutrality or
detail best practices to account for biomass resources.
Instead, we highlight the fact that current accounting for carbon
neutrality typically treats bioenergy as carbon neutral even
though the scientific literature does not support that categorical
treatment, as well as the significant challenges of ensuring
good climate outcomes in the absence of broader state or na-
tional policy.
Offsets
Although the carbon-management hierarchy generally urges that
offsets be used as a last resort to cover difficult-to-reduce emis-
sions such as air travel, purchased offsets are the single largest
source of reductions for nine of the 11 schools that have
announced carbon neutrality (Figure 3)—well in excess of what
is needed to offset air travel (5%–31%of emissions). One institu-
tion achieved carbon neutrality with essentially no net on-site re-
ductions, entirely through the purchase of offsets (Note S12).
In theory, offsets represent a way for actors to reduce emis-
sions at the lowest cost possible, finance reductions in other
countries, and address sectors that might not otherwise be
covered by a carbon pricing program (e.g., land-use emissions,
biogenic methane) by paying a third party for real, permanent,
and verifiable emission reductions. In practice, offsets have
been a controversial policy tool. Early implementation of offsets
under the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mecha-
nism led to some high-profile failures, including perverse incen-
tives to generate more fluorinated GHG emissions.43–45 Ensuring
that offset projects are truly additional and that they are perma-
nent (i.e., the carbon sequestered through an offset project is not
later lost to the atmosphere) is extremely challenging,46–49 even
for best-in-class programs such as California’s regulatory
Compliance Offset Program.18
Voluntary (non-regulatory) carbon offset markets50—those
most available to HEIs—are a special challenge because the
lack of government oversight can mean that transparency and
quality enforcement suffer.51 ‘‘High-quality’’ voluntary market
offsets should meet ‘‘PAVER’’ requirements (Permanent, Addi-
tional, Verifiable, Enforceable, and Real). However, the relatively
small amount of academic literature on offsets18,49,52 in compar-
ison with their complexity and policy relevance creates real chal-
lenges for institutions looking to achieve neutrality. Nonetheless,
offsets are widely and frequently purchased by firms, institu-
tions, and individuals; the voluntary offset market represents
$300 million each year.53
The use of carbon offsets to achieve emission-reduction goals
also raises potential equity and justice concerns. Environmental
justice groups and researchers point out that if neutrality is
achieved primarily through offsets, conventional air pollution
from fossil energy sources (potentially including those on cam-
puses) may continue to impact vulnerable andmarginalized pop-
ulations.54 In the U.S., local air pollution from fossil-fuel combus-
tion disproportionately impacts communities of color.55 The
2019 New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection
Act requires that offset projects have local co-benefits and limits
their use to settings where on-site reductions are not feasible,
demonstrating some policy-makers’ concern that offsets are be-
ing overused to achieve neutrality.56
These concerns about offsets are not lost on neutrality-first in-
stitutions. The prevalence of landfill methane offsets among
neutral HEIs (Figure S3) is consistent with a focus on quality,
as these offsets can have lower additionality and reversal
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concerns. Nearly all of the carbon-neutral schools have adopted
policies guiding their procurement of offsets to promote offset
quality and to align with other environmental and social con-
cerns. Colby College, for example, adopted a policy that all
offset projects must advance the UN Sustainable Development
Goals.57 We note that there is an emerging practice of offsetting
historical emissions58 or pursuing ‘‘climate positivity,’’ whereby
risks around additionality are less critical because these pur-
chases are not ‘‘displacing’’ emission reductions elsewhere
and can form an important source of finance.
Ultimately, while the best offsets represent a potential
mechanism to obtain urgently needed GHG reductions and
finance of neglected sectors, we suggest that there are limita-
tions to voluntary market offsets as a tool to support societal
decarbonization. Cost pressures may push institutions to seek
lower-cost (and therefore potentially lower-quality) offsets, a
concern raised even by offset developers.53 At worst, sup-
porting voluntary markets can risk strengthening incumbents
who might lobby against regulation of those sources18 (for
example, landfill methane could also be reduced by regula-
tions) or for weaker offset provisions in a federal program
(as happened in 2009).59
DISCUSSION
Scalability of current U.S. HEI approaches to neutrality
The original ACUPCC is a strong framework for working toward
system-scale change with leverage greater than the quantity of
emissions reduced.60 An analysis of a subset of schools under
the ACUPCC found that schools participating in the commitment
had 47% lower purchased electricity emissions and 27% less
energy use (both on a per-square-foot basis) compared with
non-signatories.61 There is evidence that carbon-neutrality com-
mitments, combined with the associated reporting, planning,
and implementation, have played an important role in driving ed-
ucation and real GHG emission reductions.
However, a firm quantitative metric for carbon neutrality risks
falling victim to Goodhart’s law, which states that metrics quickly
lose effectiveness as individuals and firms optimize to the metric
rather than its intent.62 Strict adherence to by-the-book
neutrality goals has the potential to introduce behaviors that
look more like regulatory compliance than true climate leader-
ship and innovation. As described above, a few of the schools
announcing carbon neutrality relied substantially on offsets
and/or unbundled RECs to ‘‘achieve’’ carbon neutrality
(Figure S4).63,64 Despite emerging best practices and norms to
ensure high-quality emission reductions for these strategies, un-
bundled RECs and a high reliance on offsets does not demon-
strate an approach that can be widely adopted to achieve
broad-scale climate goals.
Reliance on off-site reductions cannot scale to the larger U.S.
economy; we cannot achieve urgent climate goals (e.g., 50%–
52% emission reductions by 2030) without direct decarboniza-
tion of electricity, transport, industry, and buildings. Collectively
compiled, the strategies of these schools differ significantly from
the mix of strategies that large-scale studies of decarbonization
Figure 5. Share of emissions reductions by strategy for the U.S. deep decarbonization study versus HEI strategies
Emission reductions by type under the Obama Administration’s U.S. Mid-Century Strategy and under current carbon-neutral U.S. HEIs. HEI reductions do not
sum to 100 because we do not assume here that unbundled REC purchases lead to changes in emissions. Renewable energy from offsets and college-owned
land sequestration are shown in lighter red. The percentages shown are meant to illustrate patterns rather than provide exact numerical information.
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predict for the U.S. as a whole (Figure 5). Relative to the U.S.
Government’s 2016 Mid-Century Strategy (MCS) for Deep De-
carbonization,65 which characterized reductions needed to
offset growth and reduce emissions 80% by 2050, the HEIs we
analyze here have underinvested in energy efficiency, new
zero-carbon electricity, and electrification (which make up 71%
of total reductions in theMCS) in favor of bioenergy andmethane
reductions. While this is an imperfect comparison between na-
tional and institutional strategies (we cannot estimate how
much energy efficiency offset growth for HEIs) and short- versus
long-term approaches, the relatively small shares of new clean
energy, CO2 removal, and electrification suggest that HEIs may
bemissing opportunities to catalyze progress in these critical ap-
proaches. Bowdoin College was the only school in our dataset
that we are aware is moving rapidly from ‘‘neutrality’’ under the
terms of the ACUPCC toward a detailed decarbonization plan
that will electrify campus heat and provide 100% renewable en-
ergy via PPAs. A focus solely on achieving neutrality first risks
over-reliance on accounting mechanisms, potentially delaying
necessarily infrastructure (and policy) changes critical to societal
decarbonization.
From institutional neutrality to a systems approach
Given the increasingly widespread adoption of neutrality targets
across the world and the concomitant concerns about the ac-
counting-based reduction strategies highlighted above, we
envision a ‘‘systems’’ rather than a ‘‘compliance’’ approach
that focuses on the aspects of neutrality that can help contribute
to the policy and market shifts needed at larger scales. Impor-
tantly, a systems approach can work in tandem with a car-
bon-neutrality target. In this approach, a neutrality target is an
optional milestone rather than an end goal and should be
considered one component of the broader system-wide decar-
bonization that can be led by HEIs. A few HEIs in our study dis-
played aspects of a systems approach to decarbonization (with
neutrality as a milestone), but this type of approach is not yet
codified or established as general practice in HEI carbon ac-
counting (or most other sectors).
What does a systems approach to climate action look like for
HEIs? Robinson et al.66 discuss the strengths of HEIs as change
agents, noting that they have ‘‘agency to change structures,’’
‘‘agency to pursue novel practices,’’ and ‘‘agency to link novel
practices to structures.’’
Changing structures (i.e., decarbonizing systems) should
include transforming the campus heating and transportation
infrastructure to run on zero-carbon electricity (e.g., heat
pumps). While not easy, reframing a goal around decarboniza-
tion is essential, as it is clear that the neutrality commitments
for these HEIs did not uniformly lead to reductions in on-site
GHG reductions. Separating decarbonization from negative-
emission technologies and offsets can reduce risks associated
with technology lock-in and excessive offsetting67,68 and can
build regional technical capacity.
Novel practices (i.e., innovation) would include piloting new
experimental technologies, decision-making tools, or policy ap-
proaches. Innovation includes ongoing research, development,
and deployment of carbon capture and storage, direct air capture,
new energy-efficiency approaches, and other new technologies.
Rather than neglect most Scope 3 emissions outside the current
ACUPCC framework, HEIs should actively address them. HEIs
can use their purchasing power to create further market pressure
to account for and reduce emissions in their supply chains. HEI
dining services can continue to explore ways to shift norms and
purchases towardmore climate-friendly diets.69,70 Given the likely
continued use of someoffsets on the pathway to decarbonization,
the potential for research by HEIs to innovate in this space is
underutilized. Recent guidelines from the Offset Network—a
group of HEIs implementing their own offset projects—encourage
more innovation and attention to co-benefits.71 The University of
California (UC) recently released a ‘‘Request for Ideas’’ to catalyze
newUC-ledoffset projects.72More institutions could harness their
research capacity to implement innovative projects that support
campus research and education goals, investigate the quality of
existing offset projects, develop new frameworks and approaches
to support the reduction of these emissions (including new ways
to finance them), and identify those projects that provide benefit
to local communities and vulnerable populations to ensure climate
justice. However, given the increasing focus on concerns about
current offsetting practices73 in the broader policy landscape,
we suggest that climate action leadership at HEIs means shifting
the focus from a heavy reliance on offsets as a compliancemech-
anism toward a focus on the broader systems and flowsof finance
required to reduce emissions from sectors such as land use.
Linking novel practices to structures (i.e., scale) could include
partnering with local governments to deploy transportation stra-
tegies or district heating. These kinds of measures produce
knowledge than can be transferred outside the institution to
help drive technical and policy innovation. For example, the
UC has created a working group combining facilities and aca-
demic expertise across campuses and have focused on areas
that could scale and create significant learning spillovers,
including energy efficiency and electrification.74 More research
that evaluates whether sustainable forest management actually
produces net carbon gains across all pools in the long term
and whether bioenergy demand can successfully alter regional
economics to increase net forest carbon would also be espe-
cially useful.
Finally, to incorporate the systems approach into their climate
actions, institutions that announce a ‘‘neutrality’’ milestone
should pair it with a clear deadline for decarbonization of Scope
1 and Scope 2 emissions. This commitment can ensure that
schools resist the temptation to ‘‘coast’’ on offsets instead of
continuing to work diligently on campus emissions. Given the Bi-
den-Harris administration’s commitment to net zero by no later
than 2050, leading U.S. institutions should have targets well
before that date.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis demonstrates strengths and limitations of non-state
action to reduce GHG emissions. It mirrors conversations in the
business sector about whether a firm can be considered respon-
sible in the climate space if it is individually carbon neutral but
fails to use its full leverage for policy changes at the state, na-
tional, or international level.75 It also shows how institutional ac-
tions can be undermined by the lack of strong standards and
broad-scale policies for electricity, land use, bioenergy, and
transportation. While virtually any climate action was likely to
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be constructive when HEI carbon-neutrality efforts began, insti-
tutions now need to think carefully about how to take action that
charts an appropriately ambitious pathway toward decarboniza-
tion for society. As we note above, neutrality commitments have
served as an important collective frame, a catalyst for institu-
tional change, and an action-forcing deadline for these HEIs.
However, it is not clear from our analysis that net carbon
neutrality alone focuses HEIs (or any institution) on where they
can have the most impact or that it drives decarbonization at
the needed pace.
As resources are limited in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic, it will be more important than ever for all institutions
to prioritize the many rapid system-scale changes needed to
avoid the worst impacts of the climate crisis. One lesson is
that, even if the substantial risks and uncertainty associated
with some accounting instruments are addressed through care-
ful consideration and study, institutions cannot neglect the
need to eliminate on-site GHG emissions and to pay more
attention to their full supply-chain emissions. A second lesson
is that climate leadership is best represented by those institu-
tions that have used their push for neutrality to help catalyze
broader efforts to decarbonize. Finally, these lessons highlight
the need for global ‘‘rebranding’’ of institutional neutrality com-
mitments as an optional milestone that can catalyze further ac-
tion toward societal decarbonization rather than the end goal of
institutional climate initiatives. While it is critical for institutions
to take responsibility for reducing their own emissions as
quickly as possible, we should be evaluating their actions in




U.S. HEIs that have achieved carbon neutrality were assembled by reviewing
press reports and consulting with staff at Second Nature, which manages the
Presidents’ Climate Leadership Commitments (previously the ACUPCC).
Eleven schools that achieved neutrality under the terms of the ‘‘Carbon
Commitment’’ were identified as of December 31, 2020 (see supplemental
experimental procedures for additional details).
Information on schools with neutrality commitments were obtained from the
Second Nature reporting portal. Gaps in reporting were supplemented with
data from the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Ed-
ucation, schools’ emissions inventory spreadsheets, and correspondence
with the sustainability staff of the institutions. To ensure equivalent comparison
across HEIs (despite differing amounts of time since neutrality) and reflect the
terms of the ACUPCC, all reductions are represented for the year in which the
school announced neutrality (subject to minor adjustments as described in
supplemental experimental procedures). Post-neutrality plans and measures
we are aware of are described in Notes S1–S11 for each HEI. Emission Scopes
1, 2, and 3 (typically only commuting and air travel for Scope 3, no other pur-
chasing or upstream methane leakage, etc.) are all included in the institutions’
gross baseline and carbon-neutral year emissions. A number of adjustments,
documented in the available R code and in supplemental experimental pro-
cedures, were needed to ensure uniform and representative comparisons
across the self-reported data.
To give a rough comparison of the relative mix of strategies across
schools, we compared the breakdown of aggregate emission reductions
from HEIs to the Obama Administration’s MCS for Deep Decarbonization65
by making a few simplifying assumptions (see supplemental experimental
procedures). This is an imperfect comparison, as the MCS reductions are
for 2050 and are measured against a baseline with considerable growth
rather than relative to a historical baseline year. These combined assump-




Further information and requests for resources should be directed to and will
be fulfilled by the lead contact, Alex Barron (abarron@smith.edu)
Materials availability
This study did not generate new unique materials.
Data and code availability
d Reported emissions data are available through Second Nature (https://
reporting.secondnature.org/). Compiled institutional emissions data
used here have been deposited at Zenodo under https://doi.org/10.
5281/zenodo.5217590 and are publicly available as of the date of pub-
lication. All other data reported in this paper will be shared by the lead
contact upon request.
d All original code (R v4.0.0, R Studio v1.3.1056) has been deposited at
Zenodo under https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5217590 and is publicly
available as of the date of publication.
d Any additional information required to reanalyze the data reported in this
paper is available from the lead contact upon request.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
oneear.2021.08.014.
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